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In 2018, the European Council suggested “regional disembarkation platforms” as 
an innovative externalization of displacement management in the Mediterranean. 
Yet, the logic of naval interception, deportation and disembarkation zones 
parallels not only Western proposals since the 1980s, but also colonial practices 
during the transatlantic slave trade. An overview of European externalization 
politics between 2006 and 2018 examines the dynamics, ambiguity and 
dehistoricization of humanitarianized border control. The article then argues that 
such ahistoricity is linked to epistemologies which reproduce colonial matrices of 
power. Like asylum politics today, slavery was a crucial structuring issue in 
nineteenth century international politics and by unearthing a deep history of 
European manufactured displacements, the article examines cases of racialized, 
suppressionist and externalized border controls from the nineteenth century 
Atlantic-Caribbean Basins. It concludes that contingent parallels exist between 
past and present regimes of captured, rescued and re-displaced people, and the 
associated transfers of humanitarian blame and responsibility. 
Keywords: EU externalization; postcoloniality; captive markets; transatlantic 
slave trade; abolitionist suppression 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 28 June, 2018, the EU Council ministers congratulated each other with an 
innovative proposal to put a halt to the life-threatening European-bound boat migration 
in the Mediterranean. Framed as preventing the tragic loss of life, and condemning 
human smugglers, they issued a press release proposing that the EU should construct 
“regional disembarkation platforms” allowing for the containment of migrants outside 
European territory (European Council Conclusion, 28 June 2018). Thus, the press 
release stated an ambition to break “the business model of the smugglers” through a 
vast border control system where “controlled centres” in Europe and “regional 
disembarkation platforms” in North Africa, would prevent the “tragic loss of life” of 
thousands of people from West and Central Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 
transported on smuggler boats. The 2018 proposal combines the concepts of extra-
territorial disembarkation, rescue at sea, and naval intervention and deportation, linked 
via a system of collaborating partner states. However, even though narrated through a 
script of human rights, it was still rejected by North African states amidst accusations 
that it amounted to neo-colonial governance of their territories (cf. Rankin and Wintour, 
21 June, 2018), a destiny common for large-scale European externalization visions.  
Externalization can be defined as processes and practices whereby actors 
complement policies to control migration across their territorial boundaries, with 
initiatives manifesting such control extra-territorially and through other public or 
private agencies than their own (cf. Lemberg-Pedersen, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2017). The 
practices of externalization are thus based on assumptions about interiority and 
exteriority, and share the characteristic of delocalizing, off-shoring and outsourcing 
sovereign power in the pursuit of certain interests (cf. Bialasiewicz, 2012; Hyndman 
and Mountz, 2008). The focus of this article is to discuss the reoccurrence of 
 
 
externalization practices by comparing the EU externalization politics between 2006 
and 2018 with dynamics of the transatlantic slave trade. 
Critiques that European border control is neo-colonial have been common for 
years, and sometimes also the actors involved seem to confirm, more or less 
deliberately, the continuation of colonial logics. Thus, in 2014, the soon-to-be Danish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anders Samuelsen, described a (non-realized) vision of 
extra-territorial asylum camps, by saying: “we will make a little piece of Denmark in 
Jordan, Lebanon or Israel.” (Gjertsen and Kaae, October 8, 2014, author’s translation). 
And in 2015, the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi’s caused an uproar among slavery 
and migration scholars when he likened EU naval operations to the nineteenth  century 
humanitarian suppression of slave trade by saying that human smugglers were “the 
slave traders of the twenty-first century” (Renzi, April 22, 2015). 
But such implicit, off-hand references to colonialism offer little in way of 
explanation. This paper therefore asks whether and how current European 
externalization politics have been influenced by colonization’s restructuring of space, 
time, knowledge, and being across the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). More 
specifically, it examines the ways in which externalization can be seen as a continuation 
of the organizing logics of the “colonial matrix of power”, which through attempts to 
assume control over economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and the production of 
subjectivities and knowledge, reproduce relations of subalternity (Quijano, 2000). What 
Franz Fanon referred to as the “European Game” - slave trade, imperialism and 
colonialism - followed a wider entangled Eurocentric power structure, through which 
colonial agents utterly transformed existing social orders across different geographic 
contexts (cf. Mignolo 2007). Comparing the social hierarchies, materialities and spatial 
imaginaries of the transatlantic slave trade, its abolitionist suppression, and current 
 
 
European visions of externalized migration control, this article examines their 
imbrication within colonial matrices of power.  
But some question the continuity of coloniality of power, understanding 
postcolonialism as signifying a temporal period, where colonial relations no longer 
apply. In the context of externalization, a political-strategic use of this stance came 
when Muammar Gaddafi, after signing the 2008 Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty, said 
that a “page had been turned” on the brutal colonial relations between the two countries 
(Dogget, June 10, 2009). Gaddafi’s claim was paradoxical, however, since the 
Friendship Treaty in fact expanded the European influence over Libyan migration 
control, and upscaled the brutal containment of migrants in the country, reflecting the 
“spatial and institutional stretching” of European border priorities onto non-European 
territories (cf. Casas-Cortes et.al., 2015, 905). Against such a perspective, this article 
instead understands “postcoloniality” to mean the complex and ongoing impacts of 
colonial encounters and their power matrices for both colonized and colonizing societies 
(Gandhi, 1998; Stoler and Cooper, 1997).  
This includes observing how, from colonial past to current European 
externalization politics, local partners are far from passive socialisees of external 
dictates, but instead re-appropriate, reverse and counter-narrate the diffusion of norms, 
rules and practices (Cassarino 2018: 405, 408). Asking about the constitutive effect of 
colonial encounters (cf. James 1963) on European displacement practices and 
epistemologies therefore de-centres dominant assumptions about the transfers of politics 
from a European interior to its exterior. Certainly, as with asylum politics today, the 
politics of transatlantic slavery was a crucial issue in European and international high 
politics. The Caribbean therefore has a long history as centre stage for European 
geopolitics and displacement practices like interdiction of boat migrants, administrative 
 
 
disembarkation, and extraterritorial detention.1 This makes it an apt entry point for 
asking about postcolonial dimensions in European displacement and border control.  
To answer how colonial matrices of power continue to exercise influence over 
current European border politics, three colonial displacement politics, which parallel 
current externalization visions and practices, are examined: Racialized border controls 
in the Caribbean after the 1791 Haitian revolution; suppressionist border control in the 
Caribbean and Africa during the 19th century, and British and American externalization 
of recaptured African slaves in the 18th and 19th century. This materialist 
rehistoricization of current border politics is a novel approach to postcolonial analysis. 
It unearths a deep European history of stretching borders and migration control, and 
moves inquiries away from discussing these in ahistorical terms of urgency, emergency 
and security. Observing how colonial elements and practices reoccur in present 
institutions, infrastructures and markets of Western displacement politics, allows a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics, problems and potential trajectory of current 
externalization politics.  
The article starts out with some methodological reflections, before offering a 
postcolonial critique of Western studies and politics on forced migration. Hereafter 
follows a discussion of key EU externalization politics, that identifies reoccurring logics 
and tensions with humanitarianized control from the 1980s and to 2018. Seeing these 
logics as the commodification of capture, rescue and re-displacement, the article 
establishes a postcolonial nexus point to the transatlantic slave trade policy complex. It 
then moves on to analysing three colonial cases of displacement politics from the 18th 
and 19th century colonialism, before arriving at its conclusion. 
 
Method and delimitation 
 
 
 
I apply an inclusive and synthesizing methodology (Suri 2012) that combines field 
visits and purposive literature reviews (cf. Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). This is 
complemented by searches in digital media, policy databases and colonial archives, as 
well as conceptual work. The fieldwork took place over five months distributed across 
2017- 2019 with visits to sites central for the colonial slave trade through the West 
African, Caribbean and American Basins. These sites included Portugal (Lagos and 
Lisbon), West Africa (Ashanti Kingdom, Accra and Cape Coast in Ghana), the 
Caribbean (St. Croix), and the US (New York, Charleston and Key West). I structured 
the relation between the desk and on-site methodologies as a repeating research cycle 
(cf. Hennink, Hutter and Bailer, 2010), in order to continuously update the conceptual 
framework according to new knowledge gained from the field, databases and archives. 
The purpose of this was to harness a combined critical potential and to unsettle standard 
epistemologies about displacement. 
Refugee and forced migration studies, critical border studies, and studies of 
slavery and colonialism all offer crucial insights here. Yet, there is great need for the 
two former disciplines to engage more with colonial arcs of border practices (f.i. 
Walters, 2015, 10-11). This is also reflected in the lack of cross-disciplinary 
engagement between the above disciplines, and the ensuing absence of comparative 
studies between already-existing and current cases of displacement. This risks 
bypassing potential parallels, policy lessons and theoretical advances (Hansen, 1996, 8). 
An interdisciplinary approach, and selection of current and colonial case material help 
direct our gaze to the postcolonial blind spots in studies of displacement.  
This article fashions out one possible postcolonial inquiry by identifying 
reoccurring elements or practices in current and colonial displacement politics. Such a 
 
 
comparison accords with the ambition of genealogical inquiries for historical 
problematization of the present by disrupting pretensions of intact linear lines through 
history. However, it also differs from genealogy by basing its conceptualization on 
comparative case studies rather than grand scale tracing of (dis)continuities. The 
difference concerns the notion of continuity, that is, making sense of the relations 
between past, present and future (Kleist Forthcoming). As Birthe Kundrus (2005, 31-
33) has remarked, such relations are difficult to establish, and postcolonial analyses of 
continuity are often ambitious, but also ambiguous if they assume relations between 
temporal eras of a decisive character. Such an ambition is therefore also beyond the 
scope of this inquiry, which is instead based on a more partial understanding of 
continuity, implying neither causality nor finality, but instead open-ended processes. 
Here, continuity understood as the solidification and stabilization of particular elements 
or practices (Schwietring, 2005, 57) can lead to their reoccurrence over time. These 
occurrences can then be compared.  
However, while the postcolonial encounters behind European displacement 
politics may thus be understood as such open-ended and ongoing processes, this still 
leaves unclear the exact relation of continuity between its reoccurring elements or 
practices. Here, the difference between reoccurrence and recurrence is instructive: 
While the latter denotes something that keeps on happening over and over again, the 
former denotes only when something has happened before. In other words: recurrence 
implies a relation of necessary reproduction, whereas reoccurrence implies one that is 
only contingently so. While the two may overlap, proceeding from such a contingent 
understanding of continuity, leads to the question of how reoccurring elements or 
practices in European displacement politics have remained stable and solid over time. 
Here, one idea is to pay attention to how larger inter-imperial networks of thought and 
 
 
practice on issues like displacement evolved across the globe through the transfer, 
translation and adaptation between colonial powers, since “architects of colonial rule 
often turned to rival powers as allies, foils, mirrors, models and exceptions” (Kramer, 
2002, 1316). 
The idea of transfers has problems of its own, such as retaining a notion of 
stable identity through such translations, or how to weigh the many pasts transfers that 
coalesce into every moment. But its focus on contingency does seem to allow 
postcolonial analysis to revolve around reoccurring elements and practices of 
displacement. Thus, while sceptical of claims of narrow causal continuity and linear 
transfers, Kundrus (2005, 42) finds that colonial-imperial border politics in particular 
may involve a set of “rituals, behaviors, and conceptual frameworks” implemented 
several times in the form of situational contingent parallels across different contexts. In 
order to avoid vague or generalized concepts of colonial and current contexts, I examine 
the details, diversity and antagonisms of transfers unfolding on both temporal sides of 
the postcolonial comparison. This results in two further delimitations: Colonial matrices 
of power in displacement politics is examined predominantly through Anglo-American 
colonial case material, but this material should not be seen as representative of all other 
colonial displacement politics or literatures (see f.i. Bennet, 2000). Moreover, while 
crucial issues like slave rebellions, revolutions and non-European resistance are dealt 
with, comprehensive analyses of colonized, enslaved or maroon struggles is not 
undertaken. 
The following section engages in a critical and historicized deconstruction of 
research and politics on refugees and forced migration. 
 
Postcoloniality and the Repoliticization of European Displacement Governance 
 
 
 
The figures of the “refugee,” the “economic migrant” and the “illegal migrant” have 
dominated European externalization visions for decades.2 Such labelling has the effect 
of constructing policy-derived figures as individualized agents. These are inserted in a 
depoliticized vacuum, from which European political agency and economy is 
abstracted, except for limited potential for intervention in the form of either combat or 
rescue (cf. European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018, 1, 2). But when externalized 
interventions remain fixed only on victims to be rescued here-and-now, the dynamics of 
politico-temporal transformations capable of explaining displacement, its perpetuation 
and the actors involved, are moved out of sight. Accordingly, sociologists of forced 
migration have argued against homogenic understandings of “displacement” and for 
analyses, which recognize the ambiguity, contextual diversity and contingent historical 
developments of the concept (Stepputat and Nyberg Sørensen, 2014; Lubkemann, 
2008).  
Several points of critique within forced migration studies itself aligns with a 
critical acknowledgement of colonial matrices of power. First, Stephen Castles (2003, 
5) says that forced migration is not the result of “a string of unconnected emergencies 
but rather an integral part of North-South relationships”. He argues that displacement 
politics must therefore be analyzed as part of national and global socioeconomic 
transformations. Oliver Bakewell (2008) has similarly argued for the importance of 
distinguishing between conceptual categories based on analysis and policy: What 
appears to be “policy irrelevant research,” he says, is actually crucial for transcending 
the stereotypical and disaggregating policy-labels for migrants. Such epistemologies are 
shaped by political-strategic and economic interests of states, organizations and 
 
 
industrial actors (see also Zetter, 1991, 44). This critique, then, constitutes a call for 
repoliticizing our thinking about displacement. 
Second, the intimate relation between refugee and forced migration studies and 
contemporary political agendas has also been criticized for leading to a disciplinary 
“aversion to history” (Marfleet, 2007, 136-8), and the “active forgetting” of certain 
continuities in European migration politics – alongside the privileging of others 
(Kushner, 2006). The result is a tendency in refugee and forced migration studies to 
privilege a perspective derived from those post-World War II-conditions from which the 
modern refugee regime emerged.  
Part of the reason for this, is the discipline’s intimate relationship to that of law, 
leading it to reproduce the postcolonial forgetting/privileging that characterizes standard 
narratives of international human rights (Martinez 2012). This systematically leaves out 
the formative role for human rights of the events surrounding the slave trade, slave 
rebellions and abolitionist suppression. Thus, while the 1791 French revolution is 
normally depicted as central for the development of human rights, the simultaneous 
Haitian revolution is not, nor are the nineteenth century mixed commission courts in 
Sierra Leone, Cuba or Brazil, which tried 600 anti-slavery cases and freed 80.000 
recaptured slaves (Martinez, 2012, pp. 99, 114). In general, then, the effects of colonial 
matrices of power within refugee and forced migration studies leads to standard 
chronologies that actively forgets the centuries-long colonial terrains in African, 
Caribbean and American through which the relation between displacement, border 
control and humanitarianism arrived at its twenty-first century form.  
Such postcolonial critique can be combined with that of B.S. Chimni (1998, 
351) who has argued that Western policy and research on refugees is now shaped by a 
post-Cold War “myth of difference” that is used to legitimize a non-entry regime 
 
 
through specific representations of refugees. According to this myth, Western countries 
today face a virulent nationalist backlash in the form of a reaction to markedly new and 
different displacements compared to traditional and European ones, of which the 
context of the 1951 Refugee Convention is assumed to be characteristic. Following 
decolonization and the end of the Cold War, the displacement of refugees from the 
global South is thus reimagined as primarily motivated by poverty, and as taking place 
on a “unprecedented” and “unmanageable” scale. This myth, however, requires actively 
forgetting a series of displacements, both within Western contexts, but also those 
induced by European powers in colonial territories (cf. Mayblin, 2017).  
Connected with the image of an unprecedented Southern migration, Scheel and 
Squire (2015) suggest identifying those “figures of migration” used to infuse 
displacement narratives with certain meanings in policy discourses. These figures do 
not correspond to significant shifts in the lived experience of displaced people, but 
rather to systemic shifts and interests in the ways that displacement governance is 
scripted. Thus, while “the refugee” has been narrated as a passive, but deserving victim, 
the subsequent figure of the “illegal migrant,” becoming popular in the 2000s policy 
discourses, is seen as motivated by economic reasons rather than humanitarian ones. 
Much like the figure of the “human smuggler” gaining political popularity in the 2010s, 
it crystalizes how migrant autonomy, from the perspective of states, is depicted as 
agency of a dangerous, exploitative and excessive kind (Casas-Cortes et.al., 2015). 
Invoked through policy-salient labels, figures of migration therefore exist in larger arcs 
of interest-based mythologies, which trigger projections of peace and violence. And all 
can be marshalled to justify forms of intervention. 
The political vacuum within which externalization interventions are narrated by 
policy-makers and other cultural producers often fails to account for the arcs of 
 
 
socioeconomic transformations that generate displacement, as well as the actors and 
interests involved. The intimate links to the chronologies, labels and systems of power 
means that the dominant epistemologies of displacement politics facilitate the 
reoccurrence of colonial modes of governance and power. Conversely, then, 
deconstructing the prevailing mythologies, narratives and postcolonial omissions within 
these scripts holds a potential to repoliticize and contextualize European displacement 
politics.  
To illustrate this, the following section shines further light on the paradoxes of 
care, control and containment found in European displacement governance, and then 
ties these to the evolution of European externalization politics during the last decades.  
 
The Evolution of European Externalization and its Paradoxes of 
Humanitarianism, Containment and Control  
 
European externalization efforts rely on collaborating partners. Some are states, like 
Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Turkey. Others 
are national or international organizations, like the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
And yet others are private military or security companies, like Leonardo, Thales and 
Airbus (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, 2018). Some research into externalization has 
conceptualized how the external governance and physical presence on other countries’ 
territories can emanate outwards like “ripple effects” of power and control (Lavenex 
and Ucarer, 2004; Vaughan-Williams, 2009). Other strands have looked at how this 
totalizing and repressive ambition is constantly challenged by the autonomy of migrants 
or non-European states (Casas-Cortes et.al., 2015; Lemberg-Pedersen 2017). 
 
 
Nonetheless, even though the 2018 EU proposal, like its predecessors from the 1980s to 
the 2000s, is controversial and appears unrealistic (Noll 2003), a range of other 
initiatives and policy processes have continuously widened the concentric circles of 
European externalized control into Africa through joint training and exchanges of 
police, border guards and technical maintenance officers (cf. Casas-Cortes and 
Cobarrubias, 2019). Externalizing agents may also deploy many different policy devices 
(Zaiotti, 2016), spanning from securitized naval operations, detention, readmission 
agreements and deportation and export of control infrastructures (Carrera et.al. 2016; 
Lemberg-Pedersen 2019), but also humanitarian evacuations, asylum processing, 
humanitarian aid and refugee camps (Collyer and King, 2015).  
Part and parcel of colonial matrices of power is the observable ambivalence in 
the twin appeals to security and rights, which have characterized humanitarian action 
since its inception in 18th century anti-slavery politics (cf. Lester and Dussart, 2014). 
Critical border studies have analyzed the “humanitarianization” of border politics, and 
how border scripts oscillating between concerns of security and human rights allow 
actors to justify policies by moving rapidly across spectres of aid and intervention 
(Walters, 2011, Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Cuttitta, 2018). These oscillations frame 
migrants as both at risk and a risk, to be countered through European intervention 
(Aradau, 2004). In what follows, the article examines the ambivalent appeals to 
care/control in EU externalization politics, by tracing key events in the evolution of the 
EU’s naval and externalized border controls between 2006-2018. 
In the early 2000s, the same Western African coastlines where the transatlantic 
slave trade and its suppression had occurred one and a half century earlier, had become 
the prime sites of European border control, and the relation between Spain and Morocco 
was crucial. It brought about the construction of the Integrated External Surveillance 
 
 
System (SIVE) in 2002, the collaboration between the Spanish Guardia Civil and the 
Moroccan Gendarmes in 2004 and Project Seahorse and Seahorse Network, financed 
via the EU’s AENEAS instrument, in 2006 and 2008. These initiatives were designed to 
prevent boat migration through databases, satellites and land and sea operations (Casas-
Cortes et.al.2015; Carrera et.al.2016). 
In 2006, building on these bilateral and union-funded efforts, and expanding on 
the goal of “fighting illegal immigration,” the first naval operation of the Frontex 
Agency, Hera, was launched. Around 6800 Senegalese, Mauritanian and Cape Verdean 
boat migrants were intercepted and their rights to non-refoulement and accessing 
asylum procedures on the Spanish Canary Isles were side-tracked. Carling and 
Hernández-Carretero (2011, 55) have pointed out that while the operation	did	deploy 
some humanitarian scripts, these constituted a “double-edged sword” for migrants, since 
also allowing EU governments to treat migrants as passive victims. In the next years, 
Frontex’s naval operations expanded geographically, with Operation Poseidon in 
Greek/Turkish waters, and Operation Nautilus (renamed Chromos) and Operation 
Hermes in the Central Mediterranean.  
Then, following the 2008 Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty, the two countries 
implemented a push back policy, where Italians interdicted boat migrants and 
transferred them to a militarized Libyan system of detention, labour exploitation and 
abuse. The role of Libya in European border politics illustrates that for non-European 
actors, externalization partnerships may also be perceived as diplomatic leverage and 
economic gain. In 2010, for instance, Muammar Gaddafi tried to pressure European 
politicians to transfer billions of euro to his regime, through racialized tropes on 
boatmigration, as he threatened to “turn Europe black” by stopping Libyan border 
controls (cf. Squires, August 31, 2010). As the so-called Arab Spring led to Gaddafi’s 
 
 
demise and resulted in mass displacement across North Africa, operation Hermes 2011 
was also launched with the ambition to “control illegal migration flows from Tunisia” 
(Frontex, 2011). However, the period after 2011 also led to a shift away from EU 
institutions’ defensive stance to extraterritorial rights, and towards a “gradual 
introduction” of more explicit humanitarian language (Moreno-Lax, 2018, 5). 
This shift was facilitated both by the 2012 ECtHR-verdict in Hirsi and others v 
Italy, which found the Italian/Libyan push back-agreement unlawful, but also by the 
tragic drowning of more than 500 people off the coast of Lampedusa in 2013. A direct 
result was the Italian government’s military SAR operation in 2014, called Mare 
Nostrum. Rescuing 170.000 boat migrants, however, it quickly drew criticism from 
anti-immigration European governments accusing it of attracting boat migrants. 
Consequently, after one year, the EU refused to take over Mare Nostrum and instead 
launched the smaller Frontex operations Triton, and later Triton+. While the Triton 
operation did rescue more than 14.500 people, both operations were criticized for 
avoiding rescues close to Libyan territory. Moreover, Frontex persisted in labelling 
those rescued as “illegal crossings,” and the EU Commission was clear that Frontex 
should be seen as a border controlling and not a SAR body (Frontex, 2014, 44-45; 
European Commission, 2014).  
Around 2014, growing public awareness about the plight of displaced persons, 
and dissatisfaction with the EU’s downscaling rescue ambitions led to an unprecedented 
growth in NGO SAR-activities on the Mediterranean. Actors like Migrant Offshore Aid 
Station (MOAS), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), SOS Mediterranee, Seawatch, Save 
the Children, and Proactiva Open Arms began to conduct rescue operations. In 2016, 
these even rescued more people than the Italian coastguard and the Italian Navy, saving 
 
 
46,796, whereas the Italian institutions saved, respectively, 35,875 and 36,084 
(Amnesty International, 2017). 
However, the shift towards non-state rescue was quickly followed by three EU 
border operations in 2015-6, each of which escalated border militarization. First, 
Operation Sophia (2015) in the central Mediterranean was not coordinated by the 
civilian Frontex Agency, but the Union’s military Common Security and Defence policy 
(European External Action Service, 2017). Second, the EU-Turkey statement in March 
2016 was framed as a large-scale scheme for resettling asylum seekers from Turkey to 
the EU and as rescuing migrants from the Balkan route (cf. European Council, 2016). 
However, it also directed the Turkish coastguard to pull back, detain and deport 
migrants heading to Greece, and gave rise to a string of horrible detention camps in 
Greece. Third, between 2017 and 2023, the EU is to transfer €285 to Libyan institutions 
under the auspices of the contested Government of National Accord (GNA). This 
support is scripted around ambitions to construct a new Libyan Search and Rescue 
(SAR)-zone coordinated by a Tripoli-based Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(MRCC) (Nielsen, November 29, 2017). However, given the Libyan coastguard’s 
violent conduct towards boat migrants, this script then has the effect of framing 
torturous interdiction, pull back and detention as humanitarian “search and rescue” (cf. 
Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019). 
In 2017, the Italian government, backed by the EU, launched a Code of Conduct. 
It was ratified by some NGOs, but was perceived by others as undermining non-state 
rescue efforts. SAR NGOs are increasingly being harassed by Libyan naval patrols and 
Greek and Italian authorities have attempted to shut down rescue operations, refusing 
disembarkation, closing ports, quarantining NGO ships, and launching criminal 
investigations of NGO staffers for human smuggling (cf. Cusumano and Gombeer, 
 
 
2018). Paradoxically, however, no steps have been taken by EU institutions or member 
states to open criminal investigations into the UN-claims that the Libyan GNA-
government has deep ties to smuggling networks that capture, exploit and move 
migrants (Nichols, February 8, 2018).  
The European desire to externalize migration control to territories outside 
Europe must be seen against the backdrop of longer-standing diplomatic tensions about 
European responsibility for those rescued at sea, and states’ refusal to allow migrants to 
disembark on their territories. Thus, since the 2000s, several cases, from Cap Anamur 
(2004), MV Clementine Mærsk (2005) and Pinar E (2009), to the more recent ones of 
Aquarius and Diciotti (2018) have led to both standoffs and ad hoc resettlements 
between European countries. The expansion of externalized and militarized border 
controls, and attempts to obstruct non-state rescue efforts leading to asylum application 
in Europe, is therefore intimately connected to this longer, unresolved arc of intra-
European tensions (cf. Guilfoyle, 2017).  
Here, the “anti-policy” of fighting human smuggling has been perceived as an 
expedient policy direction for European states, more willing to face contestation from 
people on the move, than from fellow European governments (Perkowski and Squire, 
2018). Rescue operations and the increasingly entrenched humanitarian border 
discourse thus feature in a complex and dynamic fabric of geographically expanding, 
securitized and militarized European border politics between 2006 and 2018. Cusumano 
(2019) refers to the gap between the EU’s humanitarian talk and operational border 
practice as “organized hypocrisy” caused by the conflicting interests of EU institutions, 
anti-immigration EU governments and civil society. At the structural level, says 
Pallister-Wilkins (2017, 23), the humanitarian talk also facilitates a decontextualized 
“individualization of events” that limits the space/time of interventions, and legitimizes 
 
 
both the loss of life and the prioritization of rescue here-and-now over other measures 
(see also Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017). 
This organized hypocrisy depoliticizes EU border agency through an internally 
opposed double-transfer that is both aligned with the coloniality of power, and typical 
of the union’s ascription of blame and responsibility for border tragedies: First, the 
undermining of NGO SAR operations in the Mediterranean lifts rescue efforts from the 
humanitarian realm of protection and re-categorizes it as human smuggling worthy of 
criminal prosecution. Secondly, the political potency of the humanitarian appeal is then 
transferred from the stigmatized NGO rescuers to the militarized EU border operations, 
or Libyan, Turkish or Moroccan actors. Both transfers are simultaneous, and combine 
an imperative to rescue (migrant-as-victims) with an imperative to securitize 
(smugglers-as-villains).  
Violeta Moreno-Lax (2018) argues that the outcome is a logic of “rescue-
through-interdiction/rescue-without-protection”. This leads to the “laundering” of 
hyper-militarized border controls into humanitarian practices. By laying the blame on 
smugglers or malfunctioning non- or south eastern European states, the double-transfer 
effectively paints an image of brutality and inhumanity as something outside the space 
of Europe, “delocalized” from its assumed institutionalized humanitarianism (Cuttitta, 
2018, 14-15). This spatiotemporal concentration of humanitarianized borders therefore 
has the effect of side-tracking wider debates about the socioeconomic causes, re-
occurrence and protraction of displacement, and racial hierarchies in border control, in 
favour of assumptions about European exceptionality and humanitarianism. But as 
Chimni (2004, 56) has pointed out, humanitarianism thus risks being used as an 
“instrument of an exploitative international system, which is only periodically 
mobilized to address its own worst consequences.” 
 
 
The following section turns to colonial and slavery studies in order to observe 
how economic interests in the production and circulation of displacement constitutes a 
postcolonial nexus point through which the claim of reoccurring displacement practices 
in European politics can be fleshed out. 
 
Externalized markets of captivity, rescue and re-displacement 
For migrants, the upscaled European control politics have led to changing social 
relations and life-threatening mobility choices. They are compelled to interact with 
smugglers when composing their travel itineraries (Casas-Cortes et.al., 2015, 901), and 
it has therefore been argued that the European border initiatives drafted to suppress 
smuggling in fact manufactures it (Brachet, 2018). Seen in this light, the politically 
salient struggle between smugglers and border authorities becomes partly a mirage, and 
partly a self-reinforcing cycle of competition and profit. A cycle that feeds into the 
commodification of migrant existences.  
Externalization practices produce what Ruben Andersson calls “captive 
markets” (2018, 414-8; see also Pallister-Wilkins, 2017). These are “bioeconomies”, 
which commodify dimensions of lives and living into objects of economic or political 
exchange. Captive markets in European externalization contexts include not only 
European and non-European state agency, but also a range of non-state actors like 
humanitarian or migration management organizations, as well as informal and local 
actors, like migration facilitators, human smugglers and traffickers, and networks for 
labour extraction. Referencing the situation in Libya, Andersson explains how European 
border politics have fostered the predation of vulnerable existences by multiple actors, 
to the extent that the migrants perceive themselves as “walking cashpoints” circulated 
and exploited by various militias and armed groups. Their existences constitute “goods” 
 
 
or “products” being preyed upon in money rackets and they are forced to pay “liberation 
fees” to various actors (Ibid, 428).  
But what is meant with the notion of “capture”? Focusing on profit and 
predation, Andersson does not provide more details of this concept, but it constitutes an 
important postcolonial nexus point through which the present inquiry can nuance how 
colonial matrices of power infuse externalization politics. Thus, Bernardot (2012, 12) 
introduced the idea of “sovereign capture” as a parallel between current European 
border control practices, and the capture wars of the West African Dahomey Kingdom. 
During the 17th-18th century, the Dahomey Kingdom was a crucial actor providing 
European traders with enslaved persons for the transatlantic slave trade. The brutal 
Middle Passage on which more than 12,5 million enslaved Africans were transported, is 
therefore conceptualized by slavery scholars as intersecting forms of capture and “serial 
displacement” (Byrd, 2001; Christopher, Pybus and Rediker, 2007). Capture thus used 
the violent potential of sovereign power to transform lives into wealth accumulated and 
spread among various actors, from African kings and middlemen, over slavers, 
chartered colonial companies, and plantation owners.  
Expanding on this postcolonial nexus point, we can detail the marketization that 
facilitated the serialized displacement of capture wars and slave trade further. A crucial 
development was how West Africa was singled out as the biggest export market for the 
European weapons industry (Williams, 1944, 82). From 1673 to 1704, the British Royal 
African Company exported 66.000 firearms to the region in exchange for gold, slaves, 
and ivory, and in 1700 alone, the Dutch arms industry exported 20.000 tons of 
gunpowder. These European exports grew, so that by 1730 around 180.000 guns were 
shipped to the region annually (Satiya, 2017, 29, 41). And between 1756-1815, 
150.000-200.000 British guns were being shipped to Africa every year, alongside 
 
 
around 150.000 from countries like the Netherlands, France and Denmark (Ibid, 125, 
189).  
The slave trade market thus revolved around direct incentives for manufacturing 
displacements through capture: Profits were made first from creating the conditions for 
displacement (by the European arms and shipping industries), then from the 
displacement itself (by the European slave traders and African kingdoms), and finally 
from transforming the enslaved populations into a productive workforce (by slave 
owners and the plantation industry). By 1721, persons forced into transatlantic slavery 
from Western Africa could be disembarked at no fewer than 14 Caribbean destinations, 
many of which had originally been annexed by massive shipping companies operating 
via royal charters and monopolies. And by 1790 the West African coast was dotted with 
14 British, five Dutch, four Portuguese, four Danish and three French slaving factories 
(Smallwood, 2007). In the British-dominated Caribbean and Americas, the lives of the 
captured and enslaved were instrumentalized to produce commodities chains of sugar, 
rum, tobacco, coffee and cotton. Until the early 19th century, the trade was described by 
the involved transnational royal families, ministerial, plantation, shipping and trading 
elites as the “attractive African meteor” (see Williams, 1944, 37).  
Moreover, as the exports perpetuated cycles of intra-African militarization, 
conflicts and displacements, the period after 1650 also witnessed the rise of extremely 
wealthy and highly militarized “slaving states” (cf. Curtin, 1975, 324), like the 
aforementioned Dahomey, and the Akwamu, Denkyira, Ashanti and Oyo. These 
kingdoms fought for monopoly over the function as middle men for the war captives 
delivered to the European slave interests (Law 1989). For instance, Oyo cavalry armed 
with European guns would go on capturing raids deep into the region’s interior, 
afterwards marching the enslaved south for days or weeks, towards the European slave 
 
 
forts dotting on the coastline, where ships awaited. Sometimes slaves were captured 
inland and transported down the River Volta on canoes, and from 1680 and onwards, 
the rival kingdom of Dahomey even expanded its influence on this capture economy by 
conquering the slaving ports of Porto Novo and Whydah. In 1804, an expert witness 
described the Dahomey slave trade to the British Committee of the African Association, 
saying that this commodification of mobile bodies was “carried on by a chain of 
merchants as it were, from the Coast indefinitely in many directions towards the 
interior” (quoted in Law, 1989, 46).  
These overlapping chains of slave merchants in control of swathes of territory 
thus extended from an interior used for capture and into consolidating state structures, 
making it difficult to ascertain “whether the bandit gang has turned itself into a state, or 
the state turned to banditry.” (Law, 1991, 346). Local elites engaged with this 
displacement economy were far from passive recipients of European policy dictates and 
transfers. Rather, they often used their power and position to extract the firearms and 
biggest profits, to threaten or condition European powers, to conduct wars against local 
rivals, or to build domestic networks of patronage.  
The logics of these captive markets in West Africa during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries appear to have important parallels when compared to the 
interactions between Europe and its North African externalization partners today. Jean-
Pierre Cassarino (2018, 406) points out that also current dynamics are more complex 
than unidirectional policy transfers. This is because European interests and priorities 
relating to displacement, are transformed during the encounter with North African 
actors: Funds and border control equipment are ostensibly directed from Europe to 
surveillance and capture technologies, detention and deportation infrastructures. But this 
support is also being re-appropriated by local actors across Sahel-Maghreb, and used to 
 
 
build domestic security, military and police apparatuses, often whilst continuing 
intimate links with the smuggler networks. And in some contexts, like Libya, warring 
factions like the GNA and the Libyan National Army (LNA), compete by utilizing 
international interests in a range of policy areas, including migration control. 
Externalization, says Cassarino, therefore leads to “reverse diffusion” whereby 
North African regimes and networks use their role as middle men for European 
displacement politics to impose their own conditionalities on European partners. They 
are “active borrowers” of the norms and rules transferred to them, and re-appropriate 
and commandeer them, in order to capitalize from the desire of European governments 
to manage displacement in certain ways.  
Current European externalization politics also commodifies the lives of migrants 
via blurred boundaries between capture and rescue. Both SAR and patrolling operations 
operate by making boat migrants’ mobility controllable (Tazzioli, 2016), transforming 
their bodies into new sequences of re-displacement and forced flows (Lemberg-
Pedersen, 2017). These manufactured displacements are categorized and directed 
according to a range of economic, political and strategic interests creating “intimate 
economies” in the sites of displacement (Hiemstra and Conlon, 2016), via both physical 
closeness and the knowledge about intimacies needed to maintain the complex micro 
and macro relationships of captive markets. The practices of capture/rescue also 
illustrate how humanitarianized interventions are situated on a “moral capitalist” 
landscape of “humane” displacement governance that functions via contracts for 
manufactured, extracted and circulated displacements (cf. Morris, 2017).  
Captive markets rely on infrastructures which in themselves are also profitable 
markets. Contracts for border control equipment aligned with the European 
externalization drive has resulted in export markets for Western security- and arms 
 
 
companies, like Italian Leonardo, French Thales, the pan-European Airbus, British BAE 
Systems, and American Lockheed Martin and Boeing (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013). 
Producing the technological infrastructure required for rescue/capture, like vessels, 
aircraft, helicopters and drones, these actors also collaborate with a few NGOs. In 2016, 
for instance, the SAR NGO MOAS accepted an offer from the defence and security 
company Schiebel Group for free drones, potentially vital in finding capsized boat 
migrants and monitoring state border operations. The NGO praised Schiebel as 
generous and the drone equipment as “state-of-the-art,” exhibiting it on webpages. 
Controversially, it even invited the Libyan coastguard on board during drone 
demonstrations (Cuttitta, 2018, 644).  
Another example of non-state activity on markets of externalized rescue and 
captivity is European governments’ contracting of the IOM and the UNHCR in both 
2011 and 2017 for limited humanitarian missions to Libyan detention camps. They 
assessed needs and “decongested” border regions by moving migrants from camps to 
camps in order to deflect their onward mobility away from Europe. Accordingly, in 
2011, only 20.000 out of 430.000 persons fleeing Libya were able to apply for 
protection in Malta and Lampedusa (Moreno-Lax, 2018, 7; cf. IOM, April 23, 2019; 
IOM, 2011, 2). 
This section has explored the concepts of capture markets and manufactured 
displacements in order to chart a potential path through which current European 
externalization politics can be rehistoricized. The following sections will consider three 
cases of similar colonial displacement practices and dynamics in the Atlantic and 
Caribbean. The first concerns the rise of racialized naval border controls in the wake of 
the 1791 Haitian revolution, and it underlines the centrality of the Caribbean Basin for 
externalization politics. 
 
 
 
Racialized Border Control and the Spectre of the Revolutionary Black Boat 
Migrant 
The transatlantic slave trade functioned as a major international policy nexus during 
several centuries. The naturalization of this trade was only possible through the 
maintenance of a brutal and highly racialized social order (Fanon, 1963, 63). In the 
Caribbean, it consisted of three general classes – enslaved Africans, free people of 
color, and whites (Brown, 2008). The Caribbean planter elites navigated between the 
desire for profit maximization and racialized fears of being demographically swamped 
by black slave majorities (Ferrer, 2012). But often, profit prevailed and the import of 
enslaved Africans accelerated as new sugar islands, like Jamaica, Barbados, Saint-
Domingues, and Cuba, quickly replaced each other as the peak of profit in the westward 
expanding Atlantic economy.  
European powers faced slave rebellions throughout their Caribbean 
colonizations, but by the end of the eighteenth century the revolts had become more 
widespread. And in 1791 came the crucial slave rebellion in French Saint-Domingue, an 
extremely wealthy sugar colony then known as the “Eden of the Western World.” By 
1804, this social transformation had created the free state of Haiti, sending deep shock 
waves reverberating through Caribbean sugar colonies and European metropoles alike. 
Here, the emerging printing press transmitted apocalyptic narratives of racialized and 
sexualized slave violence (cf. Johnson, 2012). 
Slavery scholars view the Haitian revolution as a crucial transformation with 
massive implications for European discussions about modernity, geopolitics and human 
rights (cf. DuBois, 2004; Blackburn, 2006). Worth noting for our inquiry is also that, 
throughout the maritime Caribbean geography, the Saint-Domingues collapse created 
 
 
decades of displacement - and of early European naval border controls. The first stage 
of flight from the former French sugar colony were characterized by spontaneous boat 
arrivals to Spanish Cuba, Santo Domingo and British Jamaica. The three colonial 
classes - white planters, free coloured and enslaved persons - occupied the boats. The 
second stage, some years later, then witnessed the naval relocations of thousands more 
from these first territories of arrival towards US Southern states like Louisiana, South 
Carolina, Philadelphia, and along the coast of the Mexican Gulf (cf. Dessens, 2015). 
Thus, while more than 25.000 boat migrants arrived to the US between 1791 and 1810, 
10.000 of these were relocated to New Orleans just between 1809-1810, nearly 
doubling the population of the city (Lemmon et.al., 2006). 
At the time, both the US and European colonial governments viewed the 
repercussions of Saint-Domingues’ collapse as a displacement crisis ripe with the 
potential for spreading black revolution. They therefore implemented highly racialized 
border control measures. This was reflected by the figures dominating European media 
and politics, namely the (white or enslaved) “Saint-Domingue refugees” and the (free 
black) “French Negro”. The former figure typically consisted of the French plantation 
elite, artisans and blacksmiths in need of assistance, alongside their human property, 
while the latter figure designated subversives from Haiti, perceived as contagious with 
revolutionary knowledge. This gave rise to the further upscaling and securitization of 
Western naval patrols in the Caribbean. One outcome was the so-called Negro 
Seaman’s Acts implemented between 1822-1848 by South Carolina (1822), Georgia 
(1829) and North Carolina (1830), and in the geopolitically aligned Spanish Cuba 
(1837). These Acts specifically prevented the arrival of free black sailors by forcing 
ship captains to ensure that these were incarcerated during the ship’s stay in port. Free 
 
 
black sailors were threatened with whipping if they returned (Hamer, 1935). One 
estimate is that 10.000 black seamen were imprisoned because of these laws.  
But these racialized border policies were concurrent with the entry of 
humanitarian-abolitionist visions into European and Western politics, and the next 
section accounts for how these also brought about newer rationales of border controls. 
 
The Rise of Humanitarianized and Suppressionist Border Controls 
 
The precursor of modern humanitarianism, the abolitionist movement, gained political 
prominence in Great Britain after the late 1700s, through mass petitions, the first 
consumer boycotts, and several congresses. The 18th and 19th century thus witnessed 
movements away from racialized dehumanization, and towards new philosophical and 
religious doctrines about human rights and equality. 
At its heart, the slave economy was “probing the limits up to which it is possible 
to discipline the body without extinguishing the life within…scaling life down to an 
arithmetical equation and finding the lowest common denominator.” (Smallwood, 2007, 
36, 43). Humanitarian action before absolute abolition was thus situated within the 
confines of a political economy that dictated the instrumentalization of life-as-
commodity. The enslaved Africans would only be cared for to the extent that they 
represented an economic investment, and early abolitionist-humanitarian arguments 
against the slave trade were actually based on consideration for the health of sailors, and 
not slaves, aboard the slaving ships. For instance, in 1830, Captain Hugh Crow (1830, 
147) of the British slaving vessel Kitty described the Middle Passage as a “necessary 
evil,” but also claimed that “Indeed I took great pains to promote the health and comfort 
of all on board by proper diet, regularity, exercise and cleanliness.” Early pro-slavery 
 
 
humanitarianism did then exist, but as arguments for the continued commodification of 
racialized individuals. 
Dale W. Tomich (2004) talks of a shift from “first” to “second slavery” in the 
early-mid 19th century, whereby new slaving routes and destinations emerged. This 
happened alongside developments like the Haitian revolution, the sugar and coffee 
plantations on Cuba, Brazil, and the south-westward expanding US cotton-frontier 
underpinned by the brutal domestic US slave trade, which re-displaced around one 
million slaves from the Northern states (cf. Baptist, 2016). 
Second slavery was also simultaneous with a change in the balancing of 
humanitarian ideas and their influence on the institution of slavery. Thus, in 1787 came 
the US Constitutional Convention’s ban on the slave trade, which was realized twenty 
years later, around the same time as the British abolition of the trade in 1807. Gradually, 
legally sanctioned slaving policies would also change toward amelioration, that is, the 
integration of humanitarian principles into the governance and commodification of trade 
and ownership of enslaved people (cf. Lester and Dussart, 2014).  
Both the slave trade and the arms export became objects of the same 
humanitarian critique. However, even though British anti-slavery efforts constituted a 
crucial milestone in the struggles against slavery and for human rights, in other ways the 
movement would also facilitate externalized regimes of imperial displacement markets. 
In its complexity, the abolitionist movement therefore “foregrounds the entanglement of 
‘rights’ with colonially informed rationales of differential humanity” (Mayblin, 2017, 
52). 
The British abolitionists were successful in pushing their agenda in the House of 
Commons, which after abolition in 1807, also established the West African Squadron: 
This launched what we can call the suppressionist border control of the slave trade. This 
 
 
extraterritorial naval control regime was accompanied by diplomatic treaties, and a 
lukewarm participation by French, Portuguese, Dutch and American vessels. The 
British policy yielded fierce diplomatic inter-imperial tensions about the right to 
intercept slaving vessels sailing under other flags, through the discussions of Right of 
Search and Equipment Clauses. As regards the Right of Search-treaties, Portugal and 
Spain were first to sign in 1817, and Netherlands joined in 1818, after years of pressure. 
Then followed Sweden in 1824, France between 1831 and 1833, and Denmark and the 
Hanse Towns from 1833 to 1839. In 1841 came the Quintuple Treaty with Austria, 
Prussia and Russia, and finally, in 1862, followed the US (cf. DuBois, 1896; Van Der 
Linden, 2010). Besides sovereign discretion, these tensions between European states, 
and also Brazil, Cuba and the US in particular, were also connected to the reluctance to 
assume responsibility for people recaptured from slaving vessels. Both of these sets of 
discussions served as a constant, and crucial legal-diplomatic backdrop to the evolution 
of suppressionist border controls, and lasted most of the nineteenth century. 
The prime adversaries to the British policy were successive US governments, 
the executive branches of which were dominated by Southern slave-trading interests, 
such as planters, slavers, and shipping and insurance companies, until the South seceded 
and launched the American Civil War (cf. Karp, 2016). Through the decades, the 
suppressionist border control nevertheless developed in fits and starts, and with it also 
the debates surrounding humanitarianism and abolition (cf. Bender, 1992). After the 
British abolition of slave ownership in 1833, more and newer vessels were dedicated to 
the suppressionist border control, which grew to include also the Squadrons of the Good 
Hope and the East Indies (Lloyd, 1949). Alongside this geographic expansion, the series 
of diplomatic treatises also brought more countries in line – officially at least – with 
abolitionism.  
 
 
Then, in the 1840s, the Palmerstonian diplomacy was succeeded by a more 
militarist approach, including naval bombardment and troop attacks on slave factories 
on the Western African coastline. This fused abolition with militarization and colonial 
annexations of Ashanti land on the Gold Coast, and attacks on ports like Mombasa 
(1845), Kilwa (1845), to the palm Oil rivers close to Lagos (1861). And as the east 
African coasts, and Zanzibar (1873) and Egypt (1877), became targets, so did the dhow-
based Arab slave trade in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Hopper, 2015). 
All told, some 181.000 “slave trade refugees” (Adderley, 1999, 67) were 
recaptured, mostly by the British Navy, but also by the Americans and the newly 
formed Haitian Navy. Great Britain also experimented with the relocation and 
resettlement of freed slaves to other colonial territories and granted stay to around 
40.000 recaptured Africans, with Bahamas and Trinidad receiving the most.  
But both Great Britain and the US also experimented with the large-scale 
externalization and disembarkation of unwanted slave trade refugees to Africa, and this 
is the focus of the next section.  
 
Atlantic Externalization and Colonial Markets of Recaptivity 
 
The different politics of Western states on slavery translated into diverging, but 
sometimes overlapping figures and practices of displacement. All made use of 
humanitarian scripts, but these oscillated between notions of commodification, 
liberation and re-displacement. In the words of Fett (2010, 89-90): “The lexicon of the 
slave trade carried forward […] as authorities wove their way erratically back and forth 
between slave-trade terminology (‘cargo’, ‘captives’, and ‘barracoons’) and the 
language of slave-trade suppression (‘liberated Africans’, ‘receptacles’ and “depots’)”. 
 
 
More eager to suppress the slave trade, Haiti had already in the 1810s begun its 
suppressionist border controls, with vessels like Abolition de la Traide and 
Philanthrope. It was part of a “free soil” policy that granted freed slaves legal protection 
and citizenship in the country (Ferrer, 2012). By contrast, during the early stages of 
suppression, the individual US states had been developing their own responses to 
interdicted and freed slaves. But in 1819, after heavy lobbyism from the American 
Colonization Society (ACS), the effort was federalized, and a statute authorized the 
president to make regulations “for the safe keeping, support, and removal beyond the 
limits of the United States, of all such negroes, mulattoes, or persons of colour, as may 
be so delivered and brought within their jurisdiction”. Adding an external component 
that fused abolitionist and pro-colonial agendas, the statute further mandated the 
appointment of “a proper person or persons, residing upon the coast of Africa,” to 
receive the disembarked slaves (Act of March 3 1819, SEC 2).  
While the US Africa Squadron had received minuscule support since its start in 
1819, American dreams of annexing Cuba, in line with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine about 
hemispheric naval dominance (cf. Karp, 2011), meant that the USS Mohawk, USS 
Wyandotte and USS Crusader were deployed to patrol and intercept slaving vessels 
along the Cuban coasts in 1858-1860. 
The naval suppression efforts meant the freeing of enslaved persons, but this 
humanitarian stance of Western states thus co-existed with militaristic geopolitics and 
stark racial hierarchies as governments resisted granting slave trade refugees access to 
their soil. Consequently, a series of extra-territorial administrative camps were set up 
across the Atlantic Basin, in places like Fort Augusta, Jamaica, Ruperts Valley, St. 
Helena, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Key West, Florida and Fort Sumter, South Carolina. 
 
 
Here, states disembarked recaptured slaves in order to appease the racialized fears on 
their own territories. 
On the island of Fort Sumter, South Carolina, as well as in Key West, Florida, 
the slave trade refugees were housed, fed and hospitalized at a distance from the local 
population for months until they could be deported to Africa (Fett, 2017). Their re-
displacement, in the form of deportation back across the Atlantic, was a fatal ordeal for 
many. A similar British experiment had been one of the first steps towards this Atlantic 
externalization policy, as they had exported freed, but destitute African veterans from 
the American Independence War, from the streets of London to the new colony of 
Sierra Leone, which had been purchased by philanthropists and merchants in 1787. 
Imploding with disease, poverty and re-enslavement, however, the British Crown 
assumed ownership of the colony in 1808, only to turn it into a massive disembarkation 
zone for slave trade refugees intercepted during the suppressionist border controls. Over 
50.000 recaptured people would be placed there by the British Navy. From the US, 
around 12.000 people would be removed to Liberia until the twentieth century. Of those 
that survived this deportation, most knew nothing of these territories, and evolved into a 
stigmatized societal class. For many others, those locations would not be their final 
destination, as they escaped, contracted into slavery in other African regions, entered 
Caribbean apprenticeships, or were deployed in the military. 
Illustrating the longer arc of externalized markets of (re)captivity, this Middle 
Passage-in-reverse was described as a money racket by minority black voices in the US, 
like James Pennington. And many did stand to profit from this alleged liberation effort: 
US legislation authorized prize courts to pay naval crews for every slave they freed. 
Once the recaptured slaves were sent back across the Atlantic, the US Treasury were to 
pay twenty-five dollars to the ACS for “each and every negro, mulatto, or person of 
 
 
colour” disembarked into the care of the Society in West Africa (Act of March 3 1819, 
SEC 3). The British Navy had championed a similar prize system designed to 
incentivize the recapture of enslaved people, but also causing widespread corruption (cf. 
Burroughs, 2010). Both the ACS, naval crews, the US federal government, the British 
Navy, and governors, planters and merchants in Liberia and Sierra Leone thus extracted 
profit from this humanitarianized re-displacement system.  
The geographic expansion of suppressionist border controls also had several 
unintended consequences (Van Der Linden, 2010), debated fiercely among 
contemporary politicians and within the Navy. A first concerned how the naval 
suppression created a massive competition between slavers and navies, leading to less 
sea-worthy and more dangerous embarkation practices as slavers sought to minimize the 
losses of interception, by cramming large numbers of enslaved people on steam-boats 
(Lloyd, 1949, 7; see also Heller 2015, 182-191). A second was intertwined within the 
transition from first to second slavery, and concerned how the suppressionist border 
controls facilitated new, irregular routes to Brazil, Cuba and the US South, outside the 
reach of the Western African Squadron (Marques, 2016). Third, and connected to this, 
the intra-African and -US slave trades increased massively during and after the 
suppressionist controls, without eliciting the same counteraction. 
As illustrated by the British and American geographic expansion of naval 
interventions, the second half of the nineteenth century also witnessed a revival of 
Western imperialism, in which humanitarian suppressionism and religious zeal became 
imbricated. This is also brought out by the 1885 Congo Conference in Berlin explicit in 
its combination of anti-slavery and re-colonization ambitions. Thus, the Conference’s 
Principle of Effective Occupation meant that in order to legitimize further colonization 
of Africa, states had to establish effective occupation over territories. The militaristic 
 
 
and geographical expansion of suppression efforts from the 1840s onwards had 
therefore placed the British empire in a favourable position to take a leading role in the 
shift in European colonial ambitions from the Caribbean to Africa, also known as the 
Scramble for Africa (Van Der Linden, 2010, 293). 
Thus, the abolitionist campaigning led to the condemnation of both the 
transatlantic slave trade and the arms export to West Africa, and it still stands as a 
cornerstone for universal human rights. But the dynamic and uneasy relationship 
between slavery, capture, rescue and predation generated paradoxes and critique of the 
humanitarian movement. This was partly for its role in depoliticizing the contexts of 
displacement, but also for the effects of its alignment with geopolitics of racialization 
and imperialism. 
 
Conclusion 
Like asylum politics today, slavery politics was one of the structuring issues in 
nineteenth century Western displacement politics and practices. The EU’s 2018 
proposal on regional disembarkation platforms, as well as the evolution of European 
externalization practices between 2006 and 2018, link together naval interception with 
humanitarianization and extraterritorial disembarkation. This constitutes a contingent 
parallel to several Western practices during the slave trade. The preceding inquiry has 
argued that studies of borders, forced migration, slavery and colonial studies can be 
productively combined to address postcolonial matrices of power in current 
displacement politics. It yields a comparative approach that examines postcolonial 
continuity by identifying reoccurring assumptions, elements and practices in European 
displacement and externalization politics.  
 
 
The pressing need to address postcolonial continuity arose out of the dominant 
ahistoricity and depoliticization characterizing European displacement politics and 
epistemologies, which are premised on the active forgetting of some histories, and the 
privileging of myths of difference. The result is that the complexities of displacement 
crises are often narrated through a gallery of individualized and policy-salient figures of 
migration, abstracted from political arcs, interchangeable agencies, complex transfers 
and contexts. 
The article described the evolution and complex policy transfers of EU naval 
border controls and externalization to North Africa between 2006 and 2018, illustrating 
the paradoxical reliance on care and control through the case of Libya. Conceptualizing 
such externalization practices as the manufacturing of displacement taking place within 
larger markets of captivity was argued to constitute a productive postcolonial nexus 
point between current European displacement policies, and those developed during the 
transatlantic slave trade. 
The postcolonial lens on these dynamics, was operationalized through three 
colonial cases of displacement politics, selected due to their specific dynamics and 
logics of displacement, humanitarianism and border control. These were the racialized 
Spanish and American naval border control in response to the Haitian revolution; 
British and American suppressionist border controls targeting slave traders, and, finally, 
British and American recapture and externalization of enslaved Africans to Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. For while slave trade suppression has rightly come to be seen as a 
cornerstone in the development of human rights, its complex evolution also precipitated 
a competition between traders and navies harmful for the enslaved. Geopolitically, it 
was also used to facilitate the “legitimate trade,” whose exploitative and extractive 
relations also facilitated the Scramble for Africa.  
 
 
Besides contributing to the study of borders, humanitarianism and forced 
migration, each of the cases exhibited the blurred boundaries between capture, rescue 
and predation, as well as depoliticized double transfers of blame and responsibility. 
They also unfolded against backdrops of Western diplomatic tensions, which also 
characterize European externalization politics today. This illustrate the contingent 
parallels, paradoxes and unintended consequences arising out of the displacement 
governance of European empires and states, past and present. It shows how 
humanitarianized displacement politics are often ambivalent, re-appropriated, and 
harmful in its neglect of crucial contexts and implications. Then and now, the result is a 
schewed vision of displacement and its management aligned with colonial matrices of 
power. The vision is based on assumptions of European and Western exceptionality, 
itself exempt from the social and political-economic contexts it reinforces, is 
implemented in, and originates from.  
This means that crucial challenges facing current externalization politics risk 
going unrecognized. These include the false promise of safety in practices of regional 
disembarkation; how economic, political and strategic incentives can turn contracts for 
rescue and control into markets of (re)captivity; how EU externalization visions, while 
predominantly pursued in formally decolonized contexts, seem built on reoccurring 
colonial imaginations of space and mobility; and the risk that the EU externalization 
politics and visions, now expanding both in geographic scope and operational scale may 
facilitate the reoccurrence of overtly imperial and neo-colonial ambitions. 
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